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COMMENTS
THE EVOLUTION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF ERISA TO
INDIAN TRIBES: WE MAY FINALLY HAVE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, BUT IT'S STILL FLAWED
Alicia K. Crawford
L Introduction
Indian tribes have played a vital role in American history, and modernly,
they are becoming ever more a part of this country's economy. The mention
of an Indian tribe may bring to mind a history lesson or perhaps the image of
flashing lights and the sounds of ringing slot machines. Today, Indian tribes
are often associated with casinos and gaming enterprises, and many tribes
have recently seen "unprecedented economic growth and development" in
commercial and business ventures due at least in part to the emergence of
Indian gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.' The Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act was created by Congress in recognition of the fact that many
tribes were promoting gaming activities in order to raise governmental
revenue and that "a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal
economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government."2
As tribes are now "creating, owning, and operating new business
enterprises at an accelerated pace," tribal employers now find themselves in
the new position of seeking and hiring the best possible workers to fill a large
number ofjobs.' Because these new ventures and businesses are commercial
in nature, often conducted off-reservation, and include non-Indians, they raise
the issue of whether federal and state labor and employment laws may be
applied to tribal employers.
In general, the question of whether a federal or state law will apply to an
Indian tribe is guided by principles of sovereignty. Indian self-govemance
principles "are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author wishes to
express her gratitude to University of Oklahoma College of Law Professor Donald Bogan for
his insight and feedback during the drafting of this comment.
1. William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application ofFederal and State Labor and
Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1365, 1366 (1995).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
3. Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 1, at 1366.
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provided an important 'backdrop' against which vague or ambiguous federal
enactments must always be measured." The right of Indian tribes to govern
themselves, however, remains "subject to the broad power of Congress."s
Thus, Indian tribes possess sovereignty, but that sovereignty is "limited" and
"subject to complete defeasance."' At times Indian sovereignty must give way
both to state' and federal laws, including employment laws. This comment
discusses the latter. Some federal statutes with employment-law components,
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, are explicit in their non-applicability to Indian tribes.! But others are
silent on this point and are considered "statutes of general applicability."' If
a statute is one of general applicability, the determination of whether the
statute applies to Indian tribes is made judicially.o
The federal statute at issue in this comment is the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a federal employment statute that
governs employee benefit, pension, and retirement plans established and
maintained by employers." ERISA has been recognized as a statute of general
applicability because it governs all qualified employee benefit plans offered
by employers, and the exemptions from it "are explicitly and specifically
defined, as well as few in number."" There is no mention of an Indian tribal
employer in any exception.
Currently, no short answer exists as to whether ERISA will apply to an
Indian tribal employer, though some courts have already approached the
issue. 3 Although the Supreme Court has not yet answered this question, the
Pension Protection Act of 200614 amendment to ERISA has helped clear up
4. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (quoting
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973)).
5. Id.
6. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
7. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) ("Our cases make clear that the Indians'
right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state regulatory
authority on the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's border.").
8. Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 1, at 1367-76 (noting that both federal statutes
expressly exclude Indian tribes from the definition of "employer").
9. Id. at 1376.
10. Id. at 1376-77.
11. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
12. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 1989).
13. See id.; see also Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus.,
939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1991).
14. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2006)).
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some of this conflict. Even so, the result is not favorable to Indian
sovereignty.
This comment discusses the current state of Indian sovereignty matters as
it pertains to ERISA. Because tribal employment has expanded both in its
scope and in numbers, tribal employers typically now must offer employee
benefit plans to attract the best workers. Whether traditional federal
employment law, including ERISA, will regulate this area has become a hot-
button issue. This comment first explores the history of the application of a
general federal statute to a sovereign Indian tribe and focuses on the evolving
issue of whether ERISA applies to Indian tribes. More specifically, this
comment illustrates the relationship between ERISA and Indian tribes,
examining the implications that ERISA holds for Indian sovereignty and
assessing where the road leads from here for Indian tribes and ERISA.
Part II of this comment provides a brief historical overview of ERISA and
the rules and principles of Indian sovereignty. Part III examines the courts'
conflicting holdings in the determination of whether a general federal statute
such as ERISA should apply to tribes in the absence of express congressional
intent. Part IV details the Pension Plan Act amendment to the "governmental
plan exception," which provided Congress's intent with respect to Indian
tribes, and examines whether this has helped resolve the conflict. Part IV also
analyzes the current status of the applicability of ERISA to Indian tribes, as
well as its impact on the evolution of Indian sovereignty. This comment
concludes in Part V.
II. A BrieffHistory of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Applicability of a General Federal Statute to an Indian
Tribe
A. ERISA
In 1974, Congress implemented ERISA, a federal employment statute
designed to protect employees and their interests in employee benefit plans.'s
ERISA was designed to provide a uniform standard and to govern employee
benefit plans and welfare plans established or maintained by an employer or
an employee organization." The plans are "an important factor affecting the
stability of employment," and the sheer "growth in size, scope, and numbers
of employee benefit plans" spurred Congress to take action for the "well-being
15. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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and security of millions of employees and their dependents . . . directly
affected by [the] plans."" Congress thus enacted ERISA in order to
implement the twofold aim of protecting interstate commerce-a "national
public interest"-as well as the interests of the participants and beneficiaries
in employee- and welfare-benefit plans."
In order to protect the revenue of the United States and provide for the free
flow of commerce (along with protecting employees and their beneficiaries),
Congress deemed it necessary to establish minimum standards in order to
"assur[e] the equitable character of such plans and their financial
soundness." 9  ERISA protects the interests of participants and their
beneficiaries "by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans" while "providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts."20
Employers must comply with these standards by offering plans that meet the
prescribed requirements. If an employer fails to do so, a plan participant may
file suit.2'
The ERISA preemption scheme is broad. Besides an exception in what has
been termed the "saving clause,"22 which exempts state laws that regulate
insurance, banking, or securities from being preempted,2 3 the provisions of
ERISA supersede all state laws that relate to any employee benefit plan.24 In
addition, ERISA impliedly preempts all state remedies because they would
conflict with the federal ERISA remedies detailed in the Act's civil-
enforcement scheme.25 ERISA's civil-enforcement scheme is exclusive and
includes "an integrated system of procedures for enforcement."2 6 It is also
comprehensive, containing six provisions "that represent[] a careful balancing
of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1001(b).
21. Id. § 1132(a)(1).
22. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1987).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
24. Id. § 1144(a) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause],
the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... .").
25. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (stating that the "six
carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) ... provide strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly").
26. Id. at 147.
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interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." 27 In sum,
a "state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the
ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent
to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted." 28 The
preemption scheme ofERISA makes it employer-friendly, because employees
can seek only a requisite number of enumerated remedies, rather than limitless
state-law remedies.
The definitions embedded in the ERISA provisions are not difficult to
satisfy. As provided in section 1002, an "employee welfare benefit plan" and
a "welfare plan" are plans, funds, or programs established or maintained by
an employer to provide participants and their beneficiaries with medical and
fringe benefits, whether through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.2 9 An
"employee pension benefit plan" and a "pension plan" are plans, funds, or
programs offered by an employer to provide retirement income to
employees.3 0 Equally broad are the definitions of "employer" and
"employee." 3 ' From the outset, most established plans will fall under these
definitions and thus fall under ERISA's broad scope.
Despite the statute's broad reach, some explicit exceptions remain.
Specifically, "governmental plans" are exempted. The original terms of the
1974 statute defined "governmental plan" as one "established or maintained
for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the government
of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or
instrumentality of any of the foregoing."32 This exception makes no express
mention of a tribal government; therefore, unless tribal governments are
included as state- or federal-government actors, tribes are not included in the
exception. This state of affairs changed in 2006, however, when the definition
of "governmental plan" was revised. If ERISA does not apply to the Indian
tribe, then the tribe's own regulations will govern the employee benefit plan.
27. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
28. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
30. Id. § 1002(2)(A).
31. Id. § 1002(5)-(6). Under the statute, an employer is "any person acting directly as an
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan."
Id. § 1002(5). An employee is "any individual employed by an employer." Id. § 1002(6).
32. Id. § 1002(32).
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B. The Applicability of a General Federal Statute to an Indian Tribe
Indian tribes have long been recognized as "a separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social relations.",3  The principle of
sovereignty affords tribes independence as political communities "distinct"
from federal and state governments as well as the ability to retain their
"original natural rights."34 Although the sovereignty rights of Indian tribes are
well-established and historically preserved, the interplay between federal and
state governments and Indian tribal governments often ends up as a tug-of-
war.3 ' The tradition of Indian sovereignty has been promoted and upheld
through federal policy, which has encouraged tribal independence, 6 but this
is not to say that Indian tribal sovereignty is without limits.
In contrast with the sovereign rights of the states, Indian tribal sovereignty
is not only limited but also "subject to complete defeasance."" Thus, even
though this retained sovereignty is necessary in order to control and preserve
the tribes' internal relations, unique customs, and social order, Congress still
has the inherent, plenary power to "modify or extinguish that right."38 Tribal
power has been described as "necessarily subject to the overriding authority
of the United States, yet retaining necessary powers of internal self-
governance.... [T]he 'sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character."' 39 Striking a balance between tribal sovereignty rights
and the limitations thereof is not an easy task.
The right of sovereignty, of course, helps determine whether an Indian tribe
is subject to a federal law. An Indian tribe may be subjected to a federal law
if the statute is made expressly applicable to them or Congress is silent as to
the applicability. On this latter point, to be discussed infra, some courts have
33. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)).
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
35. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
156 (1980) ("The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent
sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the
Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.").
36. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980) (citing the
Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451; Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975,25 U.S.C. § 450; Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,25 U.S.C. § 461).
37. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
38. Id.
39. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323 (1978)), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)).
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fashioned rules under the guise of upholding the long-standing principles of
tribal sovereignty,which are to be used in determining whether a general
federal statute will apply. Essentially, the courts must interpret whether the
congressional silence is an expression of intent to include or exclude. Judicial
interpretation is difficult when the rules and principles conflict. Many federal
employment statutes, including ERISA, are silent as to whether they apply to
Indian tribes, and although unanimous agreement exists among courts that
Congress has the power to enforce such statutes, "[t]hey differ ... on the
central question of whether Congress intended to exercise this power and
include Indian tribal employers within the coverage of these general
statutes."40
1. The Tuscarora Rule
Courts have utilized the Tuscarora rule in determining the applicability of
a general federal statute. In Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation, the United States Supreme Court stated that "a general statute in terms
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.'"
Although this has been noted as likely dictum-albeit "dictum that has guided
many . .. decisions" 4 2 -the "rule" was adopted by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits in applying ERISA to Indian tribes.43 The Tuscarora rule is
essentially the presumption that a federal law silent as to its applicability
extends to a tribe regardless of whether such application diminishes Indian
sovereignty. As discussed infra, this presumption has garnered stark criticism
and has largely been dismissed.
2. The Coeur d'Alene Exceptions
The Ninth Circuit adopted three exceptions to the Tuscarora rule in
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, and these exceptions have since been
accepted out-of-circuit as well.44 If one of the following is found, the
Tuscarora presumption may be reversed:
(1) the law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters"; (2) the application of the law to the tribe
would "abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties"; or (3) there
40. Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 1, at 1376-77.
41. 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
42. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115.
43. See Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683
(9th Cir. 1991); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).
44. See Smart, 868 F.2d 929.
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is proof "by legislative history or some other means that Congress
intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations."4 5
These exceptions are designed as a catch-all to prevent the abrogation of
Indian sovereignty, a possibility that becomes far too certain under the
Tuscarora presumption. In sum, the analysis begins with the Tuscarora
presumption that the general federal statute will apply, and the Coeur d'Alene
exceptions are subsequently analyzed. Each of these exceptions is discussed
in turn.
First, the "aspects of tribal self-government" exception is aimed at the focal
point of Indian sovereignty: the preservation of the tribe's power to govern its
people. If the general law infringes on a tribe's self-government right, it will
not apply. This exception is aligned with long-standing principles of Indian
sovereignty, and its language is broad. But this broadness has been undercut
by the narrow construction given by the court in Coeur d'Alene, which stated
that the exception "is designed to except purely intramural matters such as
conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations
from the general rule that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian
tribes."46 The court declined to extend the definition of "tribal self-
government" to include all tribal business and commercial activity. Rather, it
held that federal law already held precedence in these fields and the exception
should not apply.47 The Ninth Circuit further narrowed the definition in
Lumber Industry Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Products Industries,
where it ruled that this exception "applies only where the tribe's decision-
making power is usurped."48
The "treaty rights" exception, like the Tuscarora rule itself, is a
presumption regarding congressional intent. An Indian treaty contains
guarantees of specific rights, and "it is presumed that Congress does not
intend to abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties when it passes general
laws, unless it makes specific reference to Indians."49 That is, in order for a
federal statute to abrogate a specific right guaranteed to a tribe in a treaty, it
45. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94
(9th Cir. 1980), supersededby statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
497, 102 Stat. 2467, as recognized in United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327, 330 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
46. Id.
47. Id. ("[O]ur cases make clear that federal taxes apply to reservation activities even
without a 'clear' expression of congressional intent.").
48. 939 F.2d at 685.
49. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
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must be explicitly stated in the statute.5 Indian treaties are read broadly and
are "construed so as to recognize generously the full obligation of the United
States to protect the interests of a dependent people."" If a treaty is involved,
courts look to the explicit statutory language in determining whether that law
would abrogate a right secured by a treaty.5 2 This analysis is intuitive because
congressional intent is explicit in a treaty in designating the specific rights,
and it follows that express statutory language is necessary in order to defeat
or override the treaty language.
Like the first exception, the treaty-rights exception has also been narrowly
construed. This exception does not say that a general federal statute is
inapplicable simply because a treaty exists. As the Seventh Circuit stated in
Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co., "More than a few federal statutes of
general application have already been applied to Tribes that are signatories to
treaties with the United States. The critical issue is whether application of the
statute would jeopardize a right that is secured by the treaty."" Although
treaties are read broadly, they delineate specific rights, and these same rights
must be expressly threatened in order for this exception to apply. It is a
matching game, and its narrow construction makes it a matter of semantics
rather than of promoting the big picture-the principle of sovereignty.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a general federal statute will not
apply if the tribe can prove "by legislative history or some other means" that
Congress intended the statute not to apply to tribes.54 Evidence must show
that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to the Indian tribe. The
circumstances surrounding the passage of the statute may be studied and used
"to exclude tribal enterprises from the scope of its coverage." 5 This intent to
exclude can be difficult to prove, however, because a statute that does not
mention applicability to Indian tribes will likely not have an extensive amount
of legislative history or discussion regarding such matters. Indeed, the notion
may not have even been considered.
In sum, these different exceptions can each rebut the Tuscarora
presumption. It is also important to note the backward analysis regarding
50. This exception is opposite in its approach to congressional intent. The Tuscarora rule
presumes that the law applies if there is no explicit language to the contrary. In contrast, the
treaty-rights exception presumes that the law should not apply unless there is explicit language.
51. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1982).
52. Id.
53. 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989).
54. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Farris, 624 F.2d at 893).
55. Id. at 1118.
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congressional intent. If none of the exceptions is found to apply, then
congressional intent is not further scrutinized, and the law will apply. If an
exception does apply, it is only then that a court will look to see whether
Congress intended the statute to apply to the tribe. This makes little sense
because, although Congress does have the power to override Indian
sovereignty, it should make its intent clear before doing so due to the
significant risk it poses to the relationship between tribes and the United
States government. Further, these exceptions have been construed very
narrowly and thus rarely will apply.
III. The Issue of Applying ERISA to an Indian Tribal Employer
A. The Status Before the Amendment
Because Congress did not mention whether ERISA would apply to Indian
tribal employers, determination of congressional intent was left to judicial
interpretation. Prior to the 2006 Pension Protection Act, the courts were faced
with the responsibility of balancing the policy and purpose of ERISA, a
federal statute of general applicability, with the self-government rights of
Indian tribes. Predictably, this led to inconsistency among courts and circuits.
Some courts applied ERISA to tribal employers under the Tuscarora-Coeur
d'Alene analysis,s" one court found that the ERISA "governmental plan"
exception under section 1002(32) applied to an Indian employer," and other
courts, in evaluating other federal employment statutes, have followed the
traditional principles of Indian sovereignty and not applied the laws in the
absence of explicit congressional intent.ss These latter courts required an
express congressional intent of application to Indian tribes before the federal
statute could be applied."
56. See Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683
(9th Cir. 1991); Smart, 868 F.2d 929.
57. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Somday, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1139 (E.D. Wash.
2000).
58. See, e.g., Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 730 F.
Supp. 324, 329 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that the formulation of a tribal pension plan is an
intramural matter and a right of self-government), rev'd, 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1991).
59. See, e.g., id.
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1. Cases Applying ERISA Under the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene Analysis:
Smart and Lumber Industry Pension Fund
Prior to the amendment two principal cases specifically addressed the
question of whether ERISA applied to an employee benefit plan established
and maintained by a tribal employer. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits both
held that ERISA applied to the tribal-employer-offered plans under the
Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene rule. The first case to examine this issue was Smart
v. State Farm Insurance Co., in which a tribal member and plan participant of
an employee benefit plan brought state-law claims in Wisconsin state court
against State Farm for allegedly failing to pay his medical-expenses claim."o
The plaintiff was a member of the Bad River Band of the Chippewa Tribe and
an employee of the Chippewa Health Center, a tribally owned entity on the
reservation."1 Following removal to federal district court, the issue on appeal
before the Seventh Circuit was whether the plaintiff's Wisconsin state-law
claims were preempted by ERISA. The court agreed with the insurer that
ERISA governed the claims.
The Seventh Circuit's inquiry began with the issue of whether Congress
intended ERISA to govern benefit plans established by a tribal employer and
held by Indian employees, where the place of business is located on an Indian
reservation.62 Because "[n]owhere in ERISA [was] mention made of the Act's
applicability to Indian Tribe employers operating a business employing
Indians on a reservation," the court had to determine whether ERISA was a
statute of general applicability and, if so, whether an exception applied."3 The
court found that ERISA was a statute of general applicability and adopted the
Tuscarora presumption that a statute of general applicability will reach
everyone within federal jurisdiction, including Indian tribes and entities,
unless they are explicitly excluded.' The court acknowledged that this
presumption was not by itself entirely or necessarily determinative of the
dispute. Instead, a court needed to determine whether application of ERISA
would affect the right of the tribe to govern itself or whether it would
extinguish rights that it held in accordance with a treaty (the Coeur d'Alene
exceptions)."
60. 868 F.2d at 930-3 1.
61. Id. at 930.
62. Id. at 932.
63. Id. at 933.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 934.
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As to the first Coeur d'Alene exception, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
although ERISA would have "the arguable effect of eviscerating self-
governance since it amounts to a subordination of the Indian government," it
"would not impermissibly upset the Tribe's self-governance in intramural
matters."6 6 Because any federal statute applied to an Indian tribe would have
some effect on its tribal sovereignty, the court stated that the statute must
actually threaten the tribe's self-government of its intramural affairs rather
than "merely affect[] self-governance as broadly conceived." The court
applied the narrow definition from Coeur d'Alene where the Ninth Circuit
limited such "intramural matters" to factors such as "conditions of tribal
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations.""
The court held that ERISA, as applied, "does not broadly and completely
define the employment relationship."" Rather, it "merely requires reporting
and accounting standards for the protection of the employees" and in so doing
protects the beneficiary while avoiding any limitation on the tribe's right to
govern its intramural affairs.o Therefore, ERISA would not affect intramural
affairs because there would be little, if any, impact on "tribal self-governance"
as conceived by Coeur d'Alene."
Although the Chippewa Tribe was a signatory to a treaty with the United
States, the second Coeur d'Alene exception was likewise rejected. The court
stated that "[s]imply because a treaty exists does not by necessity compel a
conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability is not binding on an
Indian Tribe."n Instead, tribes must demonstrate that the federal statute will
"jeopardize a right that is secured by the treaty." 7 3 In asserting that this
exception applied, the plaintiff in Smart relied on the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries.74 Although ERISA was not
at issue in the case, the Tenth Circuit held that the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), another federal statute of general applicability, did not
apply to the tribe." The treaty at issue in Navajo Forest Products Industries
explicitly provided that "no persons except those herein so authorized ...
66. Id. at 935.
67. Id.
68. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
69. Smart, 868 F.2d at 935.
70. Id. at 936.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 934-35.
73. Id. at 935.
74. 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982).
75. Id. at 714.
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shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory
described in this article."76 If the court applied OSHA, the tribe's guaranteed
right to exclude unauthorized persons from their land would have been
abrogated because OSHA would have permitted inspectors access to the land.
In Smart, the court distinguished the Chippewa treaties from the Navajo
Forest Products Industries treaty because, rather than delineating specific
rights, the Chippewa treaties "simply convey[ed] land within the exclusive
sovereignty of the Tribe."7  Therefore, the tribal plaintiff was unable to
provide evidence of any specific treaty or statutory right that would have been
affected if ERISA applied.
Finally, the court rejected the notion that ERISA's legislative history
revealed that Congress did not intend it to apply to Indian tribes. The tribal
plaintiff in Smart attempted to cloak all sovereigns as exempt under the
"governmental plan" exception. Noting that significant differences exist
between state and tribal governments and that no analogy between them
should be drawn, the court stated that there was no evidence of the purported
congressional intent to make ERISA inapplicable to tribes or Indian
employers.7 ' Therefore, the court held that ERISA standards governed the
Chippewa employment-benefit plan.
The Ninth Circuit has similarly held ERISA applicable to a tribal employer.
In Lumber Industry Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Products
Industries, a labor-union pension fund brought an action to recover pension
contributions from the Indian entity, a tribally owned-and-operated sawmill."
The district court held that ERISA did not apply to the tribe and dismissed the
fund's claim, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether ERISA would
apply to the tribe's mill operations.o
Like the Seventh Circuit in Smart, the Ninth Circuit recognized ERISA as
a statute of general applicability." The court found that the mill fell within
the "broad definition of employer" under ERISA and noted that "Congress did
not expressly state that ERISA applies to Indian tribes. If one of the
exceptions ... applies, ERISA does not apply to the mill."82
76. Id. at 711 (quoting Treaty Between the U.S. and the Navajo Tribe of Indians art. 2, June
1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667).
77. Smart, 868 F.2d at 935.
78. Id. at 936.
79. 939 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. Id. at 684-85.
81. Id. at 685.
82. Id.
No. 2] 271
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
The court rejected the district court's holding that the first Coeur d'Alene
exception to the Tuscarora rule applied. Relying on previous case law, it
further narrowed the self-government exception in holding that the statute
must "usurp the tribe's decision-making power" for the exception to be
invoked." The court concluded that, even though the tribal mill faced the
possibility of being liable for money damages, this alone would not infringe
on the tribe's self-government right.84 The court cited Coeur d'Alene for the
proposition that the "control of all tribal business and commercial activity [is]
not within [the] embrace of 'tribal self-government."'ss The Ninth Circuit
further held, without analysis, that the other two exceptions were not
applicable."
In sum, these two circuits decided that ERISA could apply to an Indian
sovereign both under the Tuscarora rule and the Coeur d'Alene exceptions,
each agreeing that the application of ERISA did not interfere with the tribes'
sovereignty. But the courts failed to discuss at length the tribes' activities or
scope of employment under the plans or whether the tribal governments fell
within the "governmental plan" exception to ERISA. These cases offered an
initial guidepost in terms of applying ERISA to a sovereign tribe, but there has
since been a break from this line of reasoning.
2. A Change in Reasoning-the Movement from the Flawed
Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene Analysis
The application of and reliance on the Tuscarora rule is flawed. First, the
Tuscarora case decided a different issue, making the extracted "rule" simply
dictum." The case itself is thus not on point with the subsequent cases that
have relied on it. This is dangerous because the rule runs counter to the
foundations of Indian sovereignty and is in direct conflict with other
longstanding principles upheld by the Supreme Court.
Due to the importance of tribal sovereignty, U.S. courts have adhered to
comity toward Indian tribes. The Tuscarora rule cuts against the principle
that "ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of Indians,""
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.
1985)).
86. Id. at 685-86.
87. Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 1, at 1393-94.
88. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 475 F.3d 1306, 1311
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
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though this concept has been favorably discussed in several contemporary,
post-Tuscarora Supreme Court cases." Simply put, if a statute's applicability
is unclear as to a tribe, it should be resolved in favor of the Indian tribe and
thus would likely not apply because it would affect the tribe's right of self-
governance. Sovereignty is the tribe's inherent right to govern itself, and any
statute applied to an Indian tribe would impair, at least to some extent, tribal
sovereignty. Another long-standing principle is that "a clear expression of
Congressional intent is necessary before a court may construe a federal statute
so as to impair tribal sovereignty."o This principle was paramount to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez9 1 and was again
relied on in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker.92 Interestingly, under
the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene reasoning, congressional intent is presumed
rather than expressed.
The initial and most fatal flaw of the Tuscarora rule is the presumption of
the applicability of these statutes when silent on the issue of Indian tribes.
Even the Coeur d'Alene exceptions, which could arguably "save" the tribal
employer from the application of the statute, cannot fix this. The exceptions
have been construed too narrowly-to the point that they rarely even
apply-to do much good. Perhaps in recognition of the injustice this line of
reasoning imposes on Indian tribes, a current judicial trend has marked an
evolution away from the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis.
a) A Glimpse at the Governmental-Commercial Distinction
After Smart, the Seventh Circuit faced a similar issue in Reich v. Great
Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlfe Commission in interpreting whether the Fair
Labor Standards Act, a federal statute of general applicability, applied against
a tribal consortium whose employees were law-enforcement officers.93
Interestingly, although this case was factually similar to Smart, the Seventh
Circuit held that the federal statute did not apply to the tribe even though, as
with the tribes in Smart and Lumber Industry Pension Fund, no treaty right
was at stake.94 The Seventh Circuit distinguished this case from the other two
89. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,766 (1985); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 390-92 (1976); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 (1973).
90. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1311.
91. 436 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1978) (concluding that suits against the tribe were barred under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity "[i]n the absence of any unequivocal expression of contrary
legislative intent").
92. 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
93. 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993).
94. Id at 493.
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by discussing the governmental-commercial distinction in the nature of the
activities involved, noting that the workers in Great Lakes were government
employees (wardens and policemen)," while "the employees in [Smart and
Lumber Industry Pension Fund] were engaged in routine activities of a
commercial or service character, namely lumbering and health care, rather
than of a governmental character." 9 6
Although the court tried to distinguish the facts of Smart from those of
Great Lakes, the court's underlying justifications actually lie in its policy
considerations of Indian sovereignty. Rather than starting with the Tuscarora
presumption and its subsequent exceptions, the Seventh Circuit focused on the
idea of comity, or "treating sovereigns, including such quasi-sovereigns as
states and Indian tribes, with greater respect than other litigants."97 The court
further explained that "[c]omity argues for allowing the Indians to manage
their own police as they like, even though no treaty confers such prerogatives,
until and unless Congress gives a stronger indication than it has here that it
wants to intrude on the sovereign functions of tribal government."" In fact,
the prerequisite of express congressional intent is at odds with the court's
application of the Tuscarora rule in Smart.
Perhaps in acknowledgment of the conflicting lines of reasoning in the
cases, the court stated that its dictum in Smart-that "federalism uniquely
concerns States; there simply is no Tribe counterpart"-went too far, instead
arguing in support of inherent tribal sovereignty by likening the sovereign
status of tribes to that held by states.99 This marked a clear shift from the
Tuscarora reasoning and evidenced a desire to uphold tribal sovereignty not
seen in Smart or Lumber Industry Pension Fund. Though the court's holding
rested under the guise of a faulty governmental-commercial distinction, the
court promoted the need for express congressional intent before the
application of the statute-an important step in the movement away from
Tuscarora.
b) A Glimpse at the Governmental-Plan Exception
Another break from the Tuscarora-Coeur d'A lene rule occurred in Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Somday, a federal case from the Eastern District of
95. Id. at 492.
96. Id. at 495.
97. Id. at 494-95.
98. Id. at 495.
99. Id.
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Washington.'o Like the court in Great Lakes, this court did not tread through
the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis. Instead of presuming congressional
intent or noting the absence of congressional intent, the court found that
Congress had indeed expressed its intent in the form of the "governmental
plan" exception. In this case, the Colville tribal government amended its
pension plan, which was strictly set up for employees of the tribe; the tribe
had the power of retained sovereignty, including the power to levy taxes.01
The plan amendment reduced the rate of benefits the employees received.'02
The tribal government brought a claim against a member of the tribe in order
to uphold the amendment, arguing that its actions did not provide the tribal
member a cause of action because it was exempt from any ERISA restrictions
on this point.'o3
The governmental-plan exception under section 1002(32) ofERISA defines
a "governmental plan" as one "established or maintained for its employees by
the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or
political subdivisions thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of
the foregoing."'" In order to prove it fell within the exception, the tribe
produced a letter authored by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), a corporate body that administers plan-termination rules and ERISA
programs of pension insurance within the Department of Labor.'0o The letter
was written in light of an earlier PBGC Letter Opinion in order to clarify the
coverage status of a tribal pension plan.o' Essentially, the earlier letter
concluded that "Congress did not intend to extend ERISA coverage to pension
plans maintained as a function of a tribe's internal sovereignty."'0 7 The PBGC
distinguished this plan from other plans that involved off-reservation, non-
Indian commercial activities and thus would not fall under the governmental-
plan exception.' The court in this case gave great deference to the opinion
of the PBGC because, in order to disregard the PBGC's determination and
conclusion, the court would "essentially [have] to find that PBGC is flat out
wrong."'0 ' And the court did not, accepting that the tribe was to be included
100. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (E.D. Wash. 2000).
101. Id. at 1131.
102. Id. at 1125.
103. Id. at 1131.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2006).
105. Somday, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
106. Id. at 1132.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1133.
109. Id. at 1131.
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under the governmental-plan exception."o The PBGC's inclusion of an Indian
tribe under this "governmental exception" represented an important step and
evidenced the government's recognition that a tribal government was to be
held under this exception.
In sum, it is difficult to determine whether a federal law should be applied
when no congressional guidance exists. It is even harder when Indian
sovereignty, a long-standing principle, is at risk. In Reich, the court moved
away from the Tuscarora rule, though it did not overrule Smart. The court's
attempt at distinguishing the tribe's activities from those of the tribe in Smart
stands as a movement in the right direction-the decision recognized Indian
sovereignty. In Somday, the court took a different approach, finding the
"governmental exception" to ERISA applied to the Indian tribe because the
tribe was performing governmental rather than commercial functions.
Cumulatively, the evolution of these cases demonstrates the importance of the
ingredients of Indian sovereignty, congressional intent, and the significance
of distinguishing between governmental and commercial activities of a tribal
employer. Even so, uncertainty still remained because both cases relied on a
faulty governmental--commercial distinction. Perhaps fortuitously, but not
coincidentally, some clarity was forthcoming.
3. The Indians Speak: The National Congress ofAmerican Indians'
Resolution
The uncertainty and inconsistency among courts regarding this issue not
surprisingly spurred the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) into
action. In a 2003 resolution, the NCAI noted the failure of the Internal
Revenue Service and Department of Labor to provide any "meaningful
guidance concerning the status of . .. tribes as 'governments' which are
entitled to the same regulatory exemptions as state, local, and federal
governments.""' NCAI passed the resolution in order "[t]o [s]upport
[p]assage of [1]egislation by the United States Congress for the [p]urpose of
[e]xpressly [c]larifying that Indian Tribal Governments are 'Governments'
[u]nder the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974
('ERISA').""i2 The NCAI's request to Congress was based on two main
principles: (1) the need of Indian employers in a competitive environment to
offer employee benefit plans to attract the best workers and (2) the Indians'
foundational right of self-government.
110. Id. at 1134-35.
111. NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, Resolution # ABO-03-116, at 2 (2003).
112. Id. at 1.
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First, the NCAI noted tribes' inherent sovereign rights and their
responsibility to their citizens' "health, safety, and welfare," which requires
the Indian tribes, through their "inherent governmental authority and powers,"
to "operat[e] an effective and efficient government body through employment
of highly-qualified individuals.""' Consequently, the NCAI recognized the
need to offer competitive employee benefit plans in order to remain
competitive with public and private employers." 4 The NCAI wanted to be
included as a "government" under ERISA so it could effectively promote its
enterprises while still retaining "the same privileges and regulatory
exemptions as state, federal, and local employers.""'
The NCAI asserted that if Congress did not recognize an Indian tribal
government to be a "government" under the governmental-plan exception of
ERISA, it "would be inconsistent with over 200 years of federal-tribal legal
history and political relations, and will adversely impact the ability of Indian
tribes to employee [sic] qualified personnel to operate essential governmental
programs for the benefit of Indian people.""'6 It is in the best interest of a tribe
to regulate and provide its own requirements for the plans it offers. But
current ERISA requirements may make it impossible for some tribes to do so.
Tribes are thus placed in a catch-22 situation: a tribe can offer an ERISA-
governed plan but must give up some of its inherent sovereign rights, or else
it can fail to offer a plan, thereby decreasing the possibility of retaining the
most skilled workers. Either way, the tribe as a whole will suffer."
113. Id
114. Id. at 2 ("Indian tribal governments, in order to be able to continue to provide employee
benefit plans on par with state, federal, and local governments, and to maintain a level of service
for its citizens consistent with that provided by other governmental entities to their citizens,
must be clearly and unambiguously recognized as 'governments' . . . through amendment ...
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Kristen E. Burge, Comment, ERISA and Indian Tribes: Alternative Approaches for
Respecting Tribal Sovereignty, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 1291, 1300 (noting that tribal employers may
cease to offer employee benefit plans if ERISA applied because "they are either unable or
unwilling to comply with ERISA's extensive requirements. As a result, tribal employers may
be unable to attract and retain the workforce necessary to maintain and continue their recent
economic growth-growth that has helped provide needed revenue for performing essential
tribal governmental functions and services.").
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B. The Amendment to the "Governmental Plan" Exception: A Day of
Reckoning?
After thirty-two years, and no doubt in part a response to the NCAI's
resolution, Congress finally broke its silence regarding whether ERISA would
govern a tribal employee benefit or pension plan. The Pension Protection Act
of 2006 significantly amended ERISA, and in pertinent part it cleared up
ambiguity by adding language to the definition of the governmental-plan
exception in section 1002(32). The exception states that "[t]he term
'governmental plan' means a plan established or maintained for its employees
by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or
political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the
foregoing.""' The amendment did not change any of the language, but it
added the following to the definition:
The term "governmental plan" includes a plan which is established
and maintained by an Indian tribal government (as defined in ...
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), a subdivision of an Indian
tribal government . . . , or an agency or instrumentality of either,
and all of the participants of which are employees of such entity
substantially all of whose services as such an employee are in the
performance of essential governmental functions but not in the
performance of commercial activities (whether or not an essential
government function)." 9
As defined in the Internal Revenue Code, an Indian tribal government is the
"governing body of any tribe, band, community, village, or group of Indians
... which is determined by the Secretary [of the Treasury] . . . to exercise
governmental functions."' 20 This will likely include any tribe, so this
definition does not present an obstacle. Even though Congress added
language that expressly included Indian tribal employers within the exception,
it is nevertheless clear that Congress intended a much narrower exception for
Indian tribes than other governments. A federal, state, or political-subdivision
plan is exempt if it is established or maintained for its employees by the
government. By contrast, in order for a plan established and maintained by a
tribal government to be exempt, all of the participants' services as employees
I18. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2006).
119. Pension Protection Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780,1051 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(40)(A) (2006).
278 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss2/2
COMMENTS
of the Indian entity must be substantially in the performance of governmental
functions and not commercial activities. This amendment therefore prevents
the preemption of ERISA in some cases, but certainly not all. Plainly,
Congress still adheres to a distinction between state and tribal sovereignty that
greatly values the former over the latter.
C. Cases Post-Amendment: Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield
and Bolssen v. Unum Life Insurance Co.
At its best, the amendment to the governmental-plan exception provides
express congressional intent as to its applicability, thus eliminating the need
for the flawed Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene analysis. At its worst, the
amendment undercuts its own purpose, perpetuates further ambiguity, and
further degrades Indian sovereignty. Since the amendment in 2006, courts
have revisited the issue. The amended definition was first analyzed in a Tenth
Circuit case, Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield.121 Initially, the
employees of an Indian tribe had brought claims against an insurer in state
court.122 The case was removed to federal court, and the court held that
ERISA preempted; the claims were dismissed.'2 3 In contrast with the court in
Somday, the federal district court held that a tribe was not exempt from
ERISA as a (pre-amendment) "governmental plan," and it decided that ERISA
applied to the employee benefit plans established by the tribes.124 Thereafter,
the case was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
During the interim of the appeal, Congress implemented the Pension
Protection Act of 2006. The Tenth Circuit therefore had the luxury of
evaluating express congressional intent, and it reasoned that "Congress
expanded the definition to clarify the legal ambiguity regarding the status of
employee benefit plans established and maintained by tribal governments."l 25
The court cited the legislative history, which stated that the bill was intended
to "'clarify that federally recognized Indian tribal governments are to be
regulated under the same government employer rules and procedures that
apply to Federal, State, and other local government employers with regard to
the establishment and maintenance of employee benefit plans. "9'l26
121. 475 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2007).
122. Id. at 1177.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1177-78.
125. Id. at 1178.
126. Id. (quoting 150 CONG. REc. S9526, 9533 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004)).
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The Tenth Circuit noted the outcomes both of Lumber Industry Pension
Fund and Smart and concluded that although the new definition "undercuts
the courts' reasoning," it would not necessarily undercut their conclusions of
ERISA applicability in the two cases. It is clear that the amendment was not
implemented by Congress to offer blanket immunity to tribal employers'
plans. Rather, the amended provision "makes a distinction between 'essential
governmental functions' and 'commercial activities,' [and] not all plans
established and maintained by tribes will fall under the governmental plan
exemption."l27 Because the court found this particular determination required
a fact-specific analysis, it remanded the case to the district court to reassess
the claim in light of the amended definition.'28 The court instructed that if the
Dobbses' benefit plan fell within the new definition of "governmental plan"
under section 1002(32), then ERISA would not preempt the state-law
claims. 129
Because the benefit plan at issue was maintained and established by an
Indian tribal government and Dobbs assisted and managed the Tribal treasury,
on remand the district court accepted his claim that his job was "a core
function of sovereign government."'3 0 The court reasoned that "[m]anagement
of the treasury is a vital element of self-governance that enables a government
to perform its most essential functions." 3 ' But although the district court
found that the benefit plan at issue met the new definition of "governmental
plan" under section 1002(32), it concluded that the amended definition in the
exception could not apply retroactively and that ERISA therefore applied.132
Even more recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin evaluated this issue in Bolssen v. Unum Life Insurance Co.133
Bolssen, an Indian employee who worked at an Indian-owned casino, filed
state-court claims against an insurance company, Unum, for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and state-law
violations.'3 4 The plan administrator removed the case to federal court,
alleging complete preemption under ERISA, and on motion to remand Bolssen
argued that his contract under the claim was not governed by ERISA due to
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1179.
130. Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 04-CV-02283-LTB, 2007 WL
24393 10, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2007).
131. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton)).
132. Id. at *4-5.
133. 629 F. Supp. 2d 878 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
134. Id. at 880.
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the governmental-plan exception. Unum successfully argued that the fact
that Bolssen was employed by the Indian tribe was not determinative of
whether the plan fell under the governmental-plan exception because
Bolssen's duties at the casino were commercial in nature and not essential
governmental functions, as required by the exception.' In agreeing with
Unum, the court discussed the distinction between "commercial activities" and
"essential governmental functions."' 37
The court acknowledged that other courts had provided little comment or
guidance regarding the 2006 amendment or in delineating the line between
commercial activities and governmental functions.'38  The court then
undertook Unum's suggestion of looking to analogous cases determining
whether provisions in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) would apply
to federal Indian tribes.' The court focused on San Manuel Indian Bingo &
Casino v. National Labor Relations Board, in which the D.C. Circuit applied
the NLRA to an Indian tribe because the tribal casino's functions were mainly
commercial in scope.'40 Acknowledging that any activity of a tribal
government can be classified as "governmental" due to its very nature, the
D.C. Circuit viewed the term in a more "restrictive sense to distinguish
between the traditional acts governments perform and collateral activities that,
though perhaps in some way related to the foregoing, lie outside their
scope."' 4 ' The court concluded that the "operation of a casino is not a
traditional attribute of self-government. Rather, the casino at issue here is
virtually identical to scores of purely commercial casinos across the
country."'4 2
Under this guidance, the Wisconsin court discussed the nature of Bolssen's
activities for the casino. Bolssen was employed as a custodian for the Oneida
tribe, which also ran a hotel, retail outlets, and farms. 4 3 Bolssen's plan
covered all Oneida employees engaged in the tribe's business enterprises.1'
The disability policy and coverage that Oneida offered its employees
distinguished between government employees and the enterprise employees,
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 881-82
138. Id. at 881.
139. Id. at 881-82.
140. 475 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
141. Id. at 1313.
142. Id. at 1315.
143. Bolssen, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
144. Id.
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and the court found that there were 1225 government employees compared
with 1324 enterprise employees.145 Although the court noted the possibility
of some recent fluctuation in the numbers, it would not have been enough to
suggest that "substantially all of the services performed by the employees
covered by the plan were of essential governmental functions, as opposed to
commercial activities," as required in the amendment.146 The court therefore
held that the plan was not a "governmental plan" due to the
governmental-commercial distinction.
IV Where We Are Today
A. The Current Analysis: The Governmental-Commercial Distinction
ERISA's applicability to tribes has undergone an evolution. Although the
amendment to the exception in 2006 helped clear up much of the uncertainty
by providing congressional intent, the analysis that followed remains flawed.
The court in Great Lakes was correct in its recognition of a deep respect for
Indian sovereignty and comity, but the court extended this only to situations
where the activities are governmental in nature. This reasoning may be
aligned with the purpose of the amendment, but it ignores the fact that an
Indian tribe is one entity-there should be no division. The exception also
leaves open the door to ambiguity and inconsistency of interpretation among
courts and circuits. To date, little authority exists describing how a
governmental and commercial activity should be determined under ERISA,
although other cases interpreting federal statutes may provide some guidance.
Not every faction of a tribal enterprise or business affects its self-
governance rights. Nor will the implementation of a federal provision silent
on its applicability necessarily abrogate Indian sovereignty. There may exist
some situations in which federal statutes can be harmoniously applied to a
tribal government. In fact, in San Manuel the D.C. Circuit noted that the
principle that
a clear statement of Congressional intent is necessary before a
court can construe a statute to limit tribal sovereignty [can be]
reconcile[d] ... with Tuscarora by recognizing that, in some cases
at least, a statute of general application can constrain the actions of
145. Id.
146. Id.
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a tribal government without at the same time impairing tribal
sovereignty.'4 7
The D.C. Circuit recognized that there are times when tribal sovereignty
will be at its strongest and times it will be at its weakest. The court stated that
tribal sovereignty is strongest when it is either "explicitly established by a
treaty" or when the tribal government acts solely within the boundaries of the
Indian reservation concerning a matter pertaining only to tribal members.' 48
These are intramural matters, and examples include "regulating the status of
tribe members in relation to one another, and determining tribe
membership."' 4 9 On the other hand, tribal sovereignty is weakest when the
tribe deals with matters that are not intramural in nature and instead are
commercial or off the reservation. so The amendment reflects this distinction.
The problem with this categorization, however, is that many cases will
invariably fall elsewhere in this very broad spectrum. In these circumstances,
the specific facts are crucial. The Supreme Court has stated that "the 'inquiry
[as to whether a general law inappropriately impairs tribal sovereignty] is not
dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of ... tribal sovereignty, but
has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
tribal interests at stake.""' The new definition of "governmental exception"
follows this reasoning. When read, the exception includes an Indian
government in the same fashion as a state or federal government. In this way
Indian sovereignty is recognized expressly. At first glance, this puts a tribal
government in the same realm as a state-government employer and promotes
the inherent sovereign rights that a tribe holds.
But pursuant to the exception, ERISA can still apply to a tribal
governmental plan in a way that it cannot to a state or federal governmental
plan. Clearly, the sovereignty levels differ. There is no line drawn between
such activities for state and federal governments. The exception is much
narrower for Indian employee benefit plans because the employee's activities
must be substantially governmental in nature. This will no doubt result in the
widespread application of ERISA to tribes due to the expansion of tribal
businesses and commercial enterprises. This requires a fact-specific inquiry
147. See San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1312-13.
151. Id. at 1313 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 135, 145
(1980)).
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in each circumstance to see to what degree ERISA's application would
threaten Indian sovereignty.
The current state of ERISA applicability to Indian tribes poses the key
question of whether ERISA applies to an Indian tribal government, regardless
of whether it is performing commercial or governmental functions. Although
the amendment provided clarity as to Congress's intent, significant policy
considerations still militate against the application of ERISA to tribes.
B. ERISA Should Not Apply to an Indian Tribe
The overarching question of whether ERISA should apply to a tribal
government is best answered with a "no." Under the current law this question
should be resolved after an intensive factual inquiry into the tribe's functions.
This distinction is rendered irrelevant, however, by the fact that tribal
commercial and governmental functions are indistinguishably intertwined.
To be fair, well-articulated arguments exist as to why ERISA should apply
to an Indian tribe. First, Congress has the power to regulate interstate
commerce 52 and, indeed, this purpose underlies ERISA.s 3 But it is not
enough simply to argue that, because Congress may have this power, it should
assert it. Long-standing principles of comity between the United States and
Indian tribes suggest otherwise. Another argument is that Indians, through
their commercial enterprises, participate in the economic life of America and
therefore should not be "free of any of the regulatory laws to which their non-
Indian competitors are subject."'5 4 As Indian tribes are "increasingly
engag[ing] in business activities in commerce with people and business
organizations from outside their reservations,""' it may seem logical to treat
them as any other employer. This includes subjecting them to labor and
employment laws. Indeed, many of the activities that tribes conduct are off-
reservation, and many of their employees are non-Indians. But this argument
misses the mark because there is no real separation between tribal
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 100 1(a) (2006) (stating that the recent growth in employee benefit plans
"has been rapid and substantial[,] that the operational scope and economic impact of such plans
is [sic] increasingly interstate[,] ... that a large volume of the activities of such plans are carried
on by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and that disclosure of
such plans and the requirements thereof is needed "to provide for the general welfare and the
free flow of commerce").
154. Richard G. McCracken, San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino: Centrally Located in
the Broad Perspective of Indian Law, 21 LAB. LAW. 157, 158 (2005).
155. Id. at 173.
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functions-the connection between a tribe's government and commercial
duties comes full circle.
Indian governments must keep pace with economic development in order
to sustain their tribes. Sustainment requires revenue: "Tribes establish tribal
businesses in order to generate revenue that is needed for performing essential
governmental functions.""' States rely on their power to tax in order to raise
revenue, and tribes also have this power."s' "The [Supreme] Court has stated
that '[the] power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because
it is a necessary instrument of self-government . . . [and] enables a tribal
government to raise revenues for its essential services ... "" The power to
tax, however, is not the only way a tribe may sustain itself, for the Court has
also held that Indians may regulate activities with nonmembers by other
means, including "commercial dealings, contracts, or other arrangements.""'
Tribes look to these other ways in which to raise their revenue, including
through commercial enterprises or businesses."1o These businesses require
employees:
Indian tribal governments, limited to the extent in which they can
offer competitive salaries and bonus options because of their
fiduciary duties to preserve the public treasury with which they
have been entrusted, must instead attract, recruit, and retain
competent and qualified individuals for employment by offering
employee benefit plans ... .16
And although it may be that some Indian businesses are for-profit, "a majority
of the profits are used to financially support tribal governments and fund
,,162governmental activities.
Further, the rise in tribal businesses is due in large part to the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under this act, tribes may use the proceeds
156. Burge, supra note 117, at 1315.
157. Id. at 1317.
158. Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).
159. Id. at 1318 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
160. Id. "[A]lithough tribes have the power to tax and to raise revenue to fund government
programs and services, their tax base is small because reservations are sparsely populated and
the residents often have a low per capita income. As a result, the income generated from taxation
is insufficient to perform necessary governmental functions. . . . Thus, the revenue from tribal
businesses activities is essential for running tribal government and carrying out basic
governmental functions." Id. at 1317.
161. NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANs, supra note 111, at 1.
162. Burge, supra note 117, at 1316.
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they make from the tribal gaming outfits for only five purposes: "(1) 'to fund
tribal government operations or programs; (2) to provide for the general
welfare of the Indian tribe and its members; (3) to promote tribal economic
development; (4) to donate to charitable organizations; or (5) to help fund
operations of local government agencies.", 63 Therefore, even if the tribe is
conducting a "commercial activity" such as a casino, the profits obtained must
be used for governmental purposes under IGRA.'"
Even assuming that a distinction could be drawn between the commercial
and governmental functions of a tribe, good authority suggests that the
relationship of a tribal employer and employee vis-A-vis an employee benefit
plan is itself an intramural affair. Under the first Coeur d'Alene exception, an
act of self-government is often described as one that is an "intramural
matter."'6 ' Though it cannot be denied that these affairs predominantly
include "tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations,"'66
tribal self-governance is not limited merely to intramural matters.'6 ' Rather,
tribes possess a wider scope of powers related to self-government. First, the
district court in the Lumber Industry Pension Fund case, which held that
ERISA should not be applied due to the Coeur d'Alene self-government
exception, stated that "the formulation and operation of a tribal pension plan
is a purely intramural matter of self-government. For the tribal self-
government exception to be of any value beyond beads and trinkets, this must
be the case."'" The Supreme Court also has spoken on this issue in Montana
v. United States, essentially noting that tribal self-governance extends to the
regulation by a tribe over nonmembers.169 Further, under the Court's analysis,
"the regulation of an employment relationship . . . is an exercise of self-
governance."7 o
163. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994)).
164. Id.
165. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
166. Id.
167. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability ofFederal Laws ofGeneralApplication to Indian
Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 85, 117 (1991).
168. Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 730 F. Supp. 324,
329 (E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1991).
169. Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 1, at 1394-95 (citing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981)).
170. Id. at 1395 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66).
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C. The Congressional and Case Law Aftermath
Not surprisingly, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 has not been well-
received by Indian tribes. The Act, by distinguishing commercial and
governmental functions, requires a tribal employer to create separate benefit
plans instead of a single plan that covers all employees. This has posed such
significant hardship to tribes that the Internal Revenue Service allowed an
extension of the one-year compliance deadline for tribes."'
Because many of the requirements of ERISA include the accounting,
auditing, and filing of plans, the Internal Revenue Service is responsible for
issuing regulations that provide guidance on a particular subject, such as
ERISA's applicability to an Indian tribe. Regulations have not been
promulgated on this issue, but the Joint Committee on Taxation's (JCX)
Technical Explanation of the pertinent section of the Pension Protection Act
provides some possible guidance."' For instance, the JCX includes as an
exempt governmental plan one held by teachers in tribal schools, but this
exemption would not protect a plan held by an employee of "tribally owned
or operated hotels, casinos, service stations, convenience stores, or marinas,
as the work conducted by the tribal employees would presumably be 'in the
performance of commercial activities,' regardless of whether such activities
were an essential governmental function.""' Again, this misses the mark
because it
ignore[s] the intrinsic link between commercial activities and tribal
governments' ability to provide essential governmental services as
part of tribal self-determination and self-governance. With this
governmental-commercial distinction created by the [Pension
Protection Act], Congress has ignored the fact that without tribal
commercial activities, any hope for tribal governments achieving
any level of self-sufficiency is seriously hindered.'74
Significantly, some members of Congress have recognized the inherent
connection between governmental and commercial activities. It has been
171. Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, De Facto Judicial Preemption ofTribal Labor and Employment
Law, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 435, 446-47.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 447-48 (quoting JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE
ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006 (2006) available
at http://www.jct.gov/x-38-06.pdf).
174. Id. at 448.
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inferred that some of these members now recognize that the current state of
ERISA applicability to Indian tribes has a negative impact on Indians and may
be contrary to ERISA's overall purpose of protecting the benefit plans of
employees."' Indeed, some members have fought for legislation that would
extinguish the governmental-commercial activity distinction, though no
congressional hearings have been commenced as of yet."' For these reasons,
no distinction should exist. A tribe's right to raise revenue in order to provide
self-governance is a significant part of the way in which it governs. This right
belongs to the tribe as a quasi-sovereign. Although the Pension Protection
Plan Act was significant in its recognition that a tribal government plan may
be exempt, the scope of those plans should not be restricted. The application
of ERISA affects the sovereign rights of tribes, as both governmental and
commercial activities preserve their right of self-governance. Though the
activities of a casino employee and an employee managing the treasury may
differ in nature, they both lead to the same result and have the same effect.
The amendment has also provided evidence of congressional intent on a
similar issue, sovereign immunity. Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity
similar to that of other sovereigns,17 7 and under federal law an Indian tribe will
be subjected to suit only if Congress has authorized the suit through
abrogation of immunity or the tribe has waived its immunity.'78 In one recent
case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
held that the 2006 amendment to ERISA evidenced a congressional waiver in
some cases, thus abrogating tribal sovereign immunity with respect to those
ERISA cases.'79 Relying on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Dobbs, the court
concluded that, under the amendment, "Congress has abrogated sovereign
immunity of the tribes with respect to certain ERISA plans."'s The court
noted that, even though Dobbs did not explicitly discuss the sovereign
immunity of tribes, "it recognized that as a result of the 2006 amendment of
[section] 2002(32), some tribal plans are exempt from ERISA and some are
175. Id. at 447 (stating that "tribes are, or will be, required to separate benefit plans that may
have previously included all governmental and commercial tribal employees. This may end up
hurting the returns on such benefit plans as the number of employees and the amount pooled
together will be reduced.").
176. Id.
177. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
178. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
179. Vandever v. Osage Nation Enter., Inc., No. 06-CV-380-GKF-TLW, 2009 WL 702776,
at *4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 16, 2009).
180. Id.
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not."18' The court therefore drew the conclusion that Dobbs acknowledged
that tribal plans would be subject to ERISA unless they fell under the new
definition of "governmental plan." 8 2 ERISA would abrogate tribal immunity
as to the plans that did not fall under this definition. This is further evidence
of injustice; the governmental-commercial distinction is a dangerous path to
follow.
V. Conclusion
Since ERISA's inception, the legislative and judicial understanding of how
and even whether ERISA should be applied to tribes has gradually evolved,
and the result has slowly become more favorable to Indians, though not
completely so. Even though the congressional intent behind ERISA is no
longer silent and the flawed Tuscarora rule is no longer a threat, the current
analysis still cuts against full respect for Indian sovereignty. In recognition
of their right to govern themselves, Indian tribes should be completely exempt
from ERISA. In balancing Congress's need to regulate interstate commerce
through ERISA and the abrogation of Indian sovereignty, the latter must
prevail because there really is no true governmental-commercial distinction
in Indian activities. Forthcoming regulations and legislation may finally
recognize this basic truth. Until then, Indians will need to continue their
uphill battle at retaining their sovereign rights as they expand further into
business enterprises in order to sustain their cultural values and presence.
181. Id. (citing Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 475 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.
2007)).
182. Id.
289No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss2/2
